The reliability assessment of infrastructure systems providing power, natural gas, and potable water is an integral part of societal preparedness to unforeseen hazards. The topological properties of interface networks connecting electric substations to water pumping stations and natural gas compressors have received little attention despite the key role these connections play in operation and failure propagation. This work introduces a performance assessment methodology for coupled infrastructures that links physical fragility modeling with the topology of realistic and ideal connecting interfaces. Distinct interfaces based on features such as betweenness, clustering, vertex degree, and Euclidean distance are assessed regarding their role in connecting utility systems and propagating failures from random and hurricane events in Harris County, Texas, United States. The interface minimizing the Euclidean distance between electric substations and other utility nodes exhibits a slow performance decline as random failures increase, and retains the greatest functionality under hurricane events compared to alternative interfaces, although it suffers from limited efficiency and controllability during normal operation. A convenient hybrid interface using both betweenness and distance features shows adequate performance during normal operation while Submitted March 24, 2010; accepted May 17, 2011; posted ahead of print May 18, 2011. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943 Copyright 2011 by the American Society of Civil Engineers A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
INTRODUCTION
The infrastructure of the Gulf Coast of the United States endures significant economic, social, and physical disruption due to hurricanes, along with other random events such as utility system failure from aging, heat, collisions, and animals. These events adversely impact the functionality of networks that supply critical services, such as power, water, and natural gas to consumers. However, lifeline systems must be sufficiently reliable and governable to ensure those persons living and working in vulnerable regions or remaining in disaster afflicted areas have access to vital utility services. The resulting complex interdependent system from coupled lifeline systems responds distinctly to disruptions due to unique failure propagation patterns through a poorly characterized web of interconnections linking, for example, electric substations to water pumping stations and natural gas compressors.
Topological and physical properties of these interconnections, denoted here as interface networks, can play an initial role explaining how failures are transmitted across infrastructure systems. While sophisticated damage prediction models exist for many types of individual infrastructure systems, the relationship between these systems and the topological properties of their interface networks has garnered little attention. This study provides a new simple yet adequate approach to estimate the performance of complex urban infrastructures subject to disruptive events by monitoring the response of their interface networks as a surrogate The complex emergent behavior of lifeline systems arises from the presence of several interconnected networks, each responding uniquely to external events, internal failures, and operation errors (Haimes and Jiang 2001; Rinaldi et al. 2001; McDaniels et al. 2007 ).
Models for interdependent systems that employ graph theoretic and flow based methods use different levels of sophistication to determine coupled system performance when subjected to systematic element removals (e.g. an ordered list of removed substations), random events such as equipment failures, or predefined hazard events (Newman et al. 2005; Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; ; Lee et al. 2007; Min et al. 2007a; Svendsen and Wolthusen 2007; Rosato et al. 2008; Ouyang et al. 2009 ). These network based methods have also been coupled with structural reliability theory to assess the seismic performance of single infrastructure systems (Hwang et al. 1998; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Shinozuka et al. 2007 ; Adachi and Ellingwood 2009), or co-located interdependent infrastructures Adachi and Ellingwood 2008) . However, few studies have assessed the performance of the distinct interface networks that couple lifeline systems when subjected to external disruptions, and how the performance of interface networks may contain information about the entire set of interdependent systems. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) has explored modeling of interdependent infrastructure and social networks (Skanata and Byrd 2007; Min et al. 2007b ) but without coupling these models to simulations of natural hazards and component vulnerability. Hence, a new methodology that incorporates network theory and physical reliability perspectives to approximate complex interdependent system performance is developed through interface networks, specially to address disruptions different from earthquake events, such as hurricanes. Random component failures are also considered to keep a reference point with previous studies.
Among all infrastructure systems, the impact of disruptions upon power systems has A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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and Albert 2002; Albert et al. 2004; Crucitti et al. 2004; Holmgren 2006; Rosas-Casals et al. 2007; Solé et al. 2003) , and the effects of overloads and error cascades on network operation (Carreras et al. 2004; Dobson et al. 2006; Pepyne 2007; Simonsen et al. 2008; Dueñas-Osorio and Vemuru 2009; Arianos et al. 2009 ).
In the context of the complex interacting systems of this study, graph theoretic concepts related to bipartite graphs, or networks whose nodes can be divided into disjoint sets (Zhou et al. 2007; Peruani et al. 2007; Mukherjee et al. 2009) , are adopted to represent the structure of interface networks that approximately capture how interconnections affect failure propagation between distinct lifeline systems. A surrogate metric of the ability of interface networks to connect electric substations to load points of other utility systems, termed interface efficiency, is also adapted here from efficiency metrics for individual networks (Boccaletti et al. 2006 ). This and other aspects of individual and interface network topology must be considered alongside the physical fragility of network elements to provide new insight into the properties of interdependent utility systems to withstand disruptive events.
In sum, this work explores the topological and physical properties of realistic and ideal interface networks connecting elements of the power, water, and gas networks of Harris County, Texas, United States, and reveal how these interfaces, acting as surrogates of the entire set of complex coupled systems, provide insights about urban infrastructure performance in the context of random failures and hurricane events. Fundamental properties of the infrastructure systems under consideration are provided in the next Section. Then, the paper presents element based physical fragility and damage models introduced recently by Winkler et al. (2010) , but expanded here to study the performance of coupled infrastructures. The methodology for constructing the electrical-utility interface from topological properties is then defined, followed by topological analysis of the synthesized networks connecting the electrical-water and electrical-gas networks within Harris County. The expanded hurricane and random damage models are subsequently applied to determine how these 5
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interface networks respond to damage. Then, the paper analyzes results of interface performance to ultimately inform design and retrofit recommendations in practice. Finally, the paper presents major conclusions concerning the properties of coupled infrastructure systems under disruptions.
DEFINITION OF INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
Let G P (V P , E P ) indicate an annotated, simple, undirected graph representing the power transmission network with an electrical generation and substation node set V P , and a transmission line (link) set E P connecting nodes within V P (Diestel 2006) . The choice of an undirected electrical network is justified by the frequency of flow reversals during outage events (Chassin and Posse 2005) . Since interface networks control the passage of power from the electrical network to the dependent water (w) or gas (g) utilities, they are represented by annotated, bipartite, undirected graphs, denoted by
is a subset of electrical substation nodes that supply power to water or gas demand nodes through interface networks (V Iu ⊂ V P ), V u are interface water or gas demand node sets, and E u are edge sets representing power transmission lines to serve interface demand nodes.
Actual flows of water and gas in their respective infrastructure networks are not modeled in order to focus on the interface topologies that provide linkages from power supply to utility demand nodes. These interface networks are constructed according to topological and geographical considerations, and serve as a first approximation of infrastructure coupling topology so that their effect on interdependent system reliability may be investigated. The combination of interface network vertices and edges along with the rest of the power system elements is referred to as the Harris County complex system in this study. Properties of the power network are presented in Table 1 , where order and size denote the number of nodes and edges, respectively, and vertex degree d(v) indicates the number of links per node v.
The demand nodes of the potable water network obtained from the City of Houston are used to represent the water supply system for the entire Harris county, as most county pumping stations (66 in total) are located within Houston (Kathy Chan, City of Houston Public Failures in the power transmission network affect the level of service the power grid can deliver immediately, resulting in an instantaneous reduction in power supply, and eventual water or gas service efficiency reductions. The electrical transmission infrastructure is also physically more vulnerable to wind damage compared to water and gas infrastructure since their associated elements, such as water pumping and gas compression stations connected by underground pipelines, are located underground (Quanta Technology 2009). Hence, electrical network reliability (only in a connectivity sense) coupled with fragility assessment of vulnerable water or gas interface elements is a major determinant of interface performance under disruptive conditions in this study.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ELEMENT DAMAGE MODELING
The joint transmission-distribution element damage model developed by Winkler et al. (2010) for evaluating hurricane impact upon power networks is adapted here to include failure estimates of the water and gas nodes. The original power system damage model uses several fragility relationships, to determine element and system level residual performance via Monte Carlo simulation. Hurricane fragility curves along with engineering design provi- infrastructure element fragility models also account for local terrain features (e.g., roughness), element physical properties, and other local conditions, such as flying debris potential in addition to the wind speed at their sites. Random failure simulation is also employed to evaluate how interface networks respond to increasing levels of node and edge failures, without the need for fragility models.
Simulation of Random Failures
Random failures and their effect on the interfaces connecting utility networks are simulated by randomly removing electrical substations, transmission lines and water or gas utility elements from the Harris complex system. Edges incident upon a randomly removed node are also removed from the networks. Any power system elements separated from generation capacity are also assumed to have failed. The total number of direct and disconnection random failures affecting an interface is given by the fraction of nodes (f n ) and edges (f e ) removed from the entire complex system. Topological properties and performance of the randomly damaged interfaces are averaged over fifty iterations per removed element fraction.
Simulation of Hurricane Hazards
The hurricane performance of the Harris complex system is tested using a series of simulated events, with return periods ranging from 10 to 1 000 years, generated with the Land Characteristics Consortium (Liu et al. 2005; Winkler et al. 2010; Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics Consortium 2001) . This set of representative wind gusts at the sites of infrastructure network elements is used to establish their probability of failure and determine A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t N o t C o p y e d i t e d the extent of damage at the interface network and associated complex system levels.
Hurricane-induced Failure of the Harris County Complex System
In addition to the power network performance assessment methods already considered by the Winkler et al. (2010) model, this work considers the wind fragility of above ground potable water pumping stations and natural gas compressors. These structures are assumed to be relatively small one story commercial buildings (Tobin 2007; Chapin and Dewberry 2006) . The water and gas pipe lines between utility nodes are not included in fragility analyses, since they are typically underground and impervious to wind damage, and are not captured by interface bipartite network models. However, regions experiencing widespread wind-induced surge hazards should incorporate flood damage modeling (Abdalla et al. 2007 ).
As with the power system damage model, pertinent log-normal fragility curves similar to Equation (1) are selected from HAZUS-MH 3 to assess the probability of reaching or exceeding a moderate level of wind damage to the j th water or natural gas network nodes:
where x j is the wind gust speed at the j th element site, and µ and σ are the logarithmic mean and standard deviation of the curve. The probability of direct damage to water or gas elements is low overall due to the required design standards applied to these installations (Sanks et al. 2008) . Specifically, water and gas utility elements are assumed to have fragilities equivalent to that of single story steel commercial installations, with median fragilities in the range of 60-72 ms −1 depending on local terrain roughness (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008). Water and gas utility failures due to disconnections from the power transmission are expected to be significantly more common than direct damage from hurricane winds (Winkler et al. 2010) . Critical water and gas facilities are typically connected to backup generation capacity to maintain a steady supply of power in case of outages (Sanks et al. 2008) . However, it is assumed in this study that backup generation fuel supplies do not and the rated line strength as a first approximation (Winkler et al. 2010) . Fifty Monte Carlo simulation iterations of the extended multi-system fragility based damage model are applied to evaluate the impact of each wind hazard scenario on the electrical system and water or gas demand nodes on their associated interface network connections.
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERFACES
An exploration of diverse realistic and ideal interface topologies provides clues as to how these coupling networks can be designed or retrofitted to best tolerate extreme events and other failures. The construction of interface networks, which can also approximate the performance of entire sets of coupled infrastructure systems, consists of selecting a subset of existing power substation supply nodes V Iu and connecting them to water or gas network demand nodes (V u ) via power transmission lines in E u . These connections consider topological and physical characteristics of the electric substation nodes as criteria for inclusion in V Iu , such as vertex degree, clustering, betweenness, and geographical location. Once constructed, the topological properties of interface networks reveal how links are distributed between coupled infrastructure node sets, the number and location of supply nodes critical to the integrity of the dependent utility networks, and their vulnerability to random failures and hurricane events.
Electrical Network Topology and Interface Performance Metrics
The construction of realistic and ideal interface networks, as detailed in the following subsection, first requires the assessment of substation node topological properties within the electrical transmission networks so that V Iu nodes may be preferentially incorporated into interfaces. Existing nodes in the power transmission and water or gas networks are connected with synthesized edges based on properties of the electrical substations. Those substations is the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j containing node v (subject to the restrictions that i = j and i, j ∈ V P ) and σ ij is the total number of shortest paths between i and j.
Central electric substation nodes (large C B ) are likely to become supply nodes of the interface network sets V Iu ; their removal from the interface due to random failures or hurricane damage seriously impairs network efficiency. Interface nodes may alternatively be selected from the power grid according to their local importance, as shown by involvement of substations in cycles of length 3 quantified by their local clustering coefficient C(v) (Newman 2003; Boccaletti et al. 2006; Lind et al. 2005 ) defined in Equation (3):
where the clustering coefficient of node i is computed from the number of edges shared by neighbors of node i (e i ) normalized by the total number of connections possible between k i nodes. Substations with many connections in the electrical network can also be incorporated into interfaces through the use of node degree d(v) rankings. In particular, the degree d(s i ) of electrical substations s i ∈ V Ip is used to assess their relative importance within an interface in terms of the availability of main feeders to deliver power. This degree-based ranking A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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procedure is often applied to other types of bipartite networks (Newman 2003; Guillaume and Latapy 2006; Peruani et al. 2007; Mukherjee et al. 2009 ). Since most power grid topological properties are influenced by the probability distribution of substation degrees, their study has revealed they match the exponentially decaying node degree distribution generated by Equation (4) 
where P (k > k ) represents the proportion of substation nodes with degree k > k , P (k) the probability density of substation nodes with degree k, and γ a constant affecting the slope of the exponential decay. This general equation may be applied to the power sets V Iu , since these also display an exponential decay in vertex degree for all synthesized interfaces as a function of their incident interface edges E u . The node degree distribution can also be linked to a theoretical random attack tolerance using the critical fraction of removable nodes (p c ) that marks the threshold before networks decompose into small, unconnected clusters from increasing levels of random failures (Rosas-Casals et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2000) .
The p c parameter connects the topological properties of a network to expected connectivity reliability under random attack. To explore interface connectivity reliability when subject to random failures, Equation (5) is used to compute the p c parameter using the corresponding γ for the interface substation supply set V Iu of each synthesized electric-water or electric-gas interface network:
The size of the largest resulting connected cluster (LCC) from interface construction also provides initial insight into the overall level of connectivity within an interface, since interfaces may contain from one to multiple clusters. While these fundamental topological properties provide a holistic assessment of interface connectivity, more specialized techniques such A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
as network efficiency (Boccaletti et al. 2006 ) are needed to better approximate interface performance from topology.
The concept of efficiency provides one method to describe interface performance explicitly in terms of path lengths separating water or gas demand nodes from electrical substation supply nodes. Boccaletti et al. (2006) utilize relational distance between nodes to define the efficiency E(G) of a network G, with 0 ≤ E(G) ≤ 1, in terms of node-to-node path lengths. Since connections between water or gas demand nodes and electrical substations affect interface reliability, the usual efficiency definition is adapted here to consider only the relational distance between each node set of the bipartite interface by restricting computation to the average of supply-demand node path lengths within an interface G Iu using Equation (6):
where N s is the number of supply nodes in V Iu , N u the number of water or gas demand nodes in V u , and RD(s i , d j ) is the relational length of the shortest path between electric supply node s i and water or gas demand node d j . This metric is readily applicable to the undirected networks used in this study. This interface efficiency metric reflects how quickly it is to reach distant portions of the networks, the ability to share flow and information, and the operation or controllability of networks in practice. The use of relational distance as opposed to physical or electrical distance of paths within the power transmission network is deemed appropriate as a first approximation due to the nearly instantaneous travel time of electricity between supply V Iu and demand V u nodes. Interface networks with short paths between V Iu and V u exhibit large E(G Iu ) scores, while networks with very long paths score poorly under this metric. Damage to the interfaces resulting in the failure of transmission lines or electrical substations will decrease interface efficiency, reducing their ability to transmit the power necessary to maintain lifeline services. The repeated monitoring of E(G Iu ) as hazard intensity increases therefore provides a simple but meaningful approach A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
for quantifying the performance change of distinct interfaces before and after random or hurricane disruptions, and determining if these surrogate interface networks capture entire interdependent infrastructure systems performance information.
Methodology for Bipartite Interface Graph Construction
Topological properties of the power transmission network are utilized to generate novel synthetic interface configurations to identify efficient and robust interfaces that tolerate random and hurricane-induced failures. Four methods of generating interface connectivities by maximizing T (s i ) objective functions for each substation-utility demand node pairing are defined in Table 2 . The objective functions all rely upon topological properties of the electrical supply nodes. These methods are employed to study the relationship of topology with interface reliability and performance. The mathematical description of the interface generation process is presented in Algorithm (1). While these networks are theoretical, existing interface networks seek to optimize many of the same practical constraints, particularly that of transmission line length to reduce implementation costs. Note that ρ ∈ Z + is defined as the number of supply nodes s i linked to each demand node d j in the utility system under consideration, although in future studies can be specific to each connection as ρ j . The interface construction schemes search for a subset V Iu of power substations in V P , ranked according to their topological properties in the power transmission network, to supply power connectivity to interface water or gas demand nodes. One of the simplest and practical approaches is to link each demand node to power supply nodes that are closest in terms of geographical Ouyang et al. 2009; . Squaring the Euclidean distance disfavors the adoption of impractical long transmission lines between supply and demand nodes. In this work ρ = 2 is chosen as a first approximation given that two electrical substations are often connected to water pumping stations to ensure a redundant and affordable power supply linkage (Sanks et al. 2008) ; gas compressors are assumed to be similarly connected.
In addition to Euclidean distance, it is also important to explore other coupling strategies M a n u s c r i p t
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that simultaneously maximize different topological criteria and minimize distance between supply and demand nodes. An alternative to a purely distance based match criterion is to link water or gas nodes to the ρ closest power substations that maximize the ratio of node betweenness centrality scores and distance (
. Substations identified as optimal using this objective function carry high flows within the power transmission network. The substation node clustering coefficient C(s i ) is also employed in place of betweenness to pair water or gas utility nodes to power transmission substations. This strategy ensures local power supply redundancy. Similarly, ranking based upon substation degree d(s i ) selects substations that are connected to several surrounding substations, reflecting the practice of linking customers to nodes with sufficient power delivery feeders. Along with employing each ranking criterion in isolation, topologically heterogeneous hybrid interfaces are also created by pairing supply-demand nodes using two or more connection schemes simultaneously, and by altering the substation intensity ρ. Schematic forms of the electric-water and electric-gas 
EVALUATION OF THE COMPLEX SYSTEM INTERFACE NETWORKS

Electric-Water Interface Properties
Key topological properties of the generated electric-water system interfaces are presented in Table 3 . Among non-hybrid interfaces, the distance and clustering approaches represent extremes in order, substation count, substation degree, edge length, tolerance of random failures in the form of the critical fraction of removal nodes (p c ), and efficiency of the undamaged networks. Also, the clustering and betweenness interfaces are topologically closer overall than the similar degree and distance interfaces. The total length of edges within the interfaces is of interest due to its role in exposing interface links to wind hazards, since a smaller total edge length is expected to decrease vulnerability of transmission lines (Winkler et al. 2010) . As expected, the realistic distance interface has the lowest total edge length and smallest connected cluster, presumably reducing its vulnerability to transmission line damage and impact on performance changes given its topological decentralization and low baseline efficiency value. This topological decentralization, resulting from a large number (82) of conveniently close low degree substations serving demand nodes in the interface, explains the low overall interface efficiency and low p c , along with low potential for coordinated operation, and high robustness to changes in graph theoretical efficiency (as shown later in this subsection). In contrast, the clustering and the betweenness interfaces possess large connected components, large total edge length, and some high degree substations, yielding highly efficient topologies that could be easily operated in practice but may be economically infeasible. These interfaces also have high theoretical random failure tolerance, but at the structure that improves the efficiency, random failure tolerance, and practical operation of distance interfaces, while retaining low edge exposure, small changes to base-line efficiencies, and feasibility for practical implementation.
The set of power supply nodes V Iw generated by each interface construction method is also of interest due to their correlations. Table 4 indicates the number of electric substations shared between the connection schemes. The betweenness and clustering connection schemes share few supply nodes, indicating that the set of nodes tends to be disjoint. Sixty three supply nodes are shared by practical degree and distance based connection methods.
Interestingly, the betweenness connection scheme is nearly a subset of the distance and degree based interfaces; this commonality is exploited by B-D interfaces to minimize the total number of substations required for hybridization in retrofit or new designs.
To further explore the topological properties of interface networks, which suggest that there is a trade-off between interface efficiency, random failure tolerance p c , and implementability, normalized interface efficiencies are studied as a function of increasing fractions of node and edge random removals. The normalized scale relative to the intact efficiency values in Table 3 enables comparisons across interfaces in terms of the rate at which absolute efficiency decreases upon disruption. The calculated interface network efficiency for each interface shown in Figures 4a-4b reveals significant differences as expected from topological analysis. While all networks suffer large normalized efficiency declines as f n and f e → 1, the rate of efficiency decline reveals that the realistic distance and degree interfaces along with feasible hybrid interfaces achieve an almost linear drop in performance as f e increases compared to the rapid declines seen for the idealized betweenness and clustering interfaces.
Similar normalized efficiency change trends, although slightly more pronounced, are observed as f n increases. There are predominantly short edges and homogeneous importance nodes in the distance, degree and hybrid interfaces (with some departures for the B-D 3 interface due to its ρ = 3) given their topological fragmentation, low average vertex degree, and low p c , which minimize the overall impact of element removals on interface efficiency changes. In hy-A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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brid networks, although most nodes contribute approximately equally to network efficiency within separate clusters, a few nodes also enhance connectivity and efficiency within and across clusters. The difference between the interface topological groups (the betweenness and clustering networks versus the distance and degree networks) is statistically significant (P-value < 0.05) except at high fractions of node or edge removals.
These betweenness and clustering interfaces also show higher degrading rates of normalized efficiency scores under random node than edge deletion due to their high average substation degree and important initial LCC size, which translates into a large increase in distance between nodes and potential loss of controllability. Although not shown in the normalized efficiency results of Figure 4b , the absolute interface efficiency values at the corresponding f n = p c levels oscillate around 0.02 for all interfaces. This observation highlights the ability of the theoretical p c value to determine a critical state of the interfaces and associated infrastructures.
Another aspect of complex utility network reliability assessment is hurricane damage tolerance. Since random failures do not account for the inherent spatial variability of hurricane damage arising from local terrain, hazard intensity, and network element fragility factors, the expanded Winkler et al. model (Winkler et al. 2010 ) is applied to assess network efficiency for each interface when exposed to a variety of wind gust scenarios. Interface networks are exposed to simulated wind fields of hurricanes occurring every 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1 000 years in addition to a HAZUS generated wind field for the 2008 Hurricane Ike. The mean interface responses in Figure 4c show that the distance interface along with degree and hybrid interfaces retain greater normalized efficiency than the betweenness and clustering interfaces at all storm intensities, although the differences are initially more pronounced.
The concave shape of all curves indicates that at low wind speeds, vulnerable edges are more likely to fail without impacting greatly the normalized efficiency scores of the interfaces, despite the heightened initial fragility and sensitivity to efficiency changes of the betweenness and clustering structures. As the hazard intensity increases, the rate of network efficiency A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
decline increases for all interfaces once the average storm wind speed exceeds approximately 48 m s −1 due to increasing risk of substation failure within the electrical network (Winkler et al. 2010) . The normalized efficiency ranges between {0.55, 0.66} of the distance, degree, and hybrid interfaces under Hurricane Ike also compares favorably with the 67% retention of water utility service reported by Harris County residents (Stein 2008) , suggesting that the performance of complex Harris County system is indirectly captured in terms of the physical fragility and topological features of practical interface models. The standard variation of the responses across events varies only between 3-5%, so interface performance differences between the topological groupings are statistically significant (P < 0.05) at all hazard levels.
This joint physical fragility and topology approach suggests that hardening supply nodes within electric-utility interfaces to better resist hurricane-force winds above the 48 m s
threshold may improve interdependent network reliability if the complex system is repeatedly subjected to strong winds. A factor influencing the resistance of the distance, degree, and B-D 2 interface networks to hurricane disruption is the small total length of transmission lines connecting water utility nodes to substations and the robustness to efficiency changes from decentralization.
Electric-Gas Interface Properties
The synthesized electric-gas interfaces are much smaller compared to the corresponding electric-water interfaces, and lack complex topological structures. The topological properties of these interfaces in Table 5 indicate that the betweenness and clustering interfaces have large connected components and higher substation degree than the distance and degree interfaces, resulting in higher efficiency scores. Given that the majority of power supply nodes in each interface are only connected to a single gas compressor, the interface network degree distributions also lacks the distinctive properties of technological networks (Newman 2003) , resulting in unimportant p c values or element correlations in the substation sets V Ig .
The responses of the electric-gas interfaces to random edge failures are presented in Figure   5a . While small differences in random failures between the electric-gas interfaces are evident, A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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the interfaces do not contain enough elements to exhibit distinct efficiency profiles except for the slightly greater susceptibility of the clustering interface to edge failures. The performance of the various electric-gas interface networks are statistically insignificant from one another in their responses to random failures (P-value > 0.05). The principal consideration in studying small power-gas utility system interfaces is therefore the size of the connected components from interface construction and the total length of the lines connecting nodes in the two networks. Hybrid interfaces in this case will not benefit the reliability of the electric-gas system due to the lack of topological and normalized efficiency loss distinctions between the potential parent interfaces.
Interface responses to random node failures shown in Figure 5b indicate that all interfaces exhibit similar but slightly non-linear declines in efficiency as f n → 1 since node removals include incident edges, in contrast to the linear efficiency profiles under just edge failures.
Hurricane damage responses of interfaces, depicted in Figure 5c , are a product of the node and edge topological and physical fragility properties coupled with differences in overall interface edge length. The increased rate of efficiency decline observed in the electric-water interfaces at wind speeds above 48 m s −1 also occurs in this electric-gas case. In contrast to the distinct hurricane performance profiles of the electric-water interfaces, the topologically homogeneous electric-gas interfaces perform similarly under hurricane demand, though the clustering network does perform less well than the other interfaces at lower wind speeds (P-value < 0.05). The normalized efficiency predictions for Hurricane Ike, ranging between {0.62, 0.66}, differ from the 92% total gas utility service retention reported by Harris County residents (Stein 2008) . This discrepancy arises from the small size of the system and the fact that failure of gas compressors does not directly translate into a loss of system pressure if other units in the system can compensate or if they can operate for extended time with their own gas as fuel.
Performance disparities between the power-gas interfaces are not sufficient to justify significant alteration of practical distance-or degree-based interfaces. Other resources such A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
as electricity and potable water are more critical for survival (McDaniels et al. 2007 ).
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The results on interface network performance confirm that when subject to random failures and hurricane events, interface response is strongly dependent on topology and physical fragility. The interface network model is shown to capture previously unknown performance aspects of the coupling mechanisms among utility systems, and their potential relation to performance of entire infrastructure systems. For instance, topological and physical features that have been shown to influence the performance profile of an interface subject to random or hurricane induced failures include the size of the largest connected component from interface constructions, the interface substation degree distribution, the edge length within interfaces, the number and distance between intervening interface elements, and the physical fragility of all complex infrastructure elements. Interface designs must therefore compromise between high efficiency, potential controllability (connectivity), and tolerance to random failures as offered by large connected interfaces, and their vulnerability to hurricane events (exposed transmission lines), sensitivity to efficiency losses, and impracticality of construction which contrasts with the features of decentralized interfaces.
Interfaces with low baseline efficiency that are composed of low degree nodes and small, disconnected clusters such as the distance and degree interfaces better tolerate efficiency changes from increasing levels of random and hurricane disruptions. These interfaces most closely resemble the actual connection scheme within electric and other utility networks as most elements are connected based on spatial proximity and power substation feeder availability. However, the number of supply nodes and decentralized structure in distance and There are several recommendations that can be implemented to increase interface resistance to both hurricane damage and random failures. Overhead transmission lines are especially vulnerable to hurricane wind gusts as their fragility is proportional to line length, so reducing the total line length of an interface network by employing a distance minimization connection scheme will result in fewer utility service disruptions, practical construction, and reduced sensitivity to efficiency reduction. However, a few long lines are needed to ease operational control challenges, increase tolerance to random failures, and maintain an adequate baseline interface efficiency. Interface failure may also be ameliorated by inserting redundant links between electric substations and utility demand nodes. Direct incorporation of generation capacity into the interface and strengthening of substation nodes and transmission lines may also be applied to reduce the effect of physical fragility and indirect disconnection of electrical substations on dependent water or gas utility service.
CONCLUSIONS
The developed construction and interface analysis methodology allows for the rapid generation and performance characterization of previously unexamined interfaces that connect disparate urban utility systems, especially when subjected to random failures and hurricane events. This interface emphasis converts the formidable task of complex system performance modeling into a more tractable problem, albeit approximate, of analyzing significantly smaller and less intricate subset networks via bipartite graphs and element fragility properties. Bipartite interfaces may be synthesized from minimal information concerning the spatial distribution of water or gas nodes within the demand networks and the topological properties of power supply nodes, allowing for performance assessment of alternative inter- A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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connection patterns. In some cases, where the efficiency-based performance metric resembles real system performance, as in power-water systems, the interface efficiency reduction from hurricane damage is shown to match actual experiences of Harris County residents. In addition, the distance and degree based interfaces resemble practical efficiency loss results and connection configurations that are based on geographical proximity and power distribution feeder availability, despite not being the most efficient or tolerant to random failure topologies. This leads to a simple proposed method for generating hybrid interfaces that combines the topological features of practical and ideal interfaces. Interface efficiency profiles of simple and hybrid interface networks are compared using varying levels of random failures and hurricane events having adequate response and feasibility in practice.
Factors including the size of large connected clusters from interface construction, substation count and associated disconnection potential, substation degree distribution, and the separation distance between interface elements are found to be the determinants of interface efficiency. Realistic interface networks minimizing the Euclidean distance between power supplying and consuming nodes, or maximizing connections to substations with sufficient feeder availability (i.e., vertex degree) show the least sensitivity to efficiency reductions from their baseline performance values when subject to random failures and hurricane disruptions. This is partly from the large number of decentralized substations and lack of significant hazard exposure of transmission lines connecting the systems, although they also display a low baseline efficiency and need additional infrastructure for enhanced operation and control.
Other interface networks created by applying clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality substation rankings produce highly efficient and controllable networks due to high supply node degree and large connected clusters of elements, but are simultaneously less practical and sensitive to efficiency losses from random and hurricane induced element failures. The correlation of these topological findings with actual flow within the utility networks will be investigated at a future date to test their consistency. Given that efficiency directly measures the ability of the interface to deliver power to the utility demand nodes, it is expected that 23
the flow models combined with hazard simulation will agree with the topological findings presented here.
Hybrid networks combining both betweenness and distance based construction methods are shown to address some of the deficiencies of their parent networks, such as improving distance-based interface efficiency, controllability, and theoretical random failure thresholds, while decreasing betweenness-based fragility of exposed edges and sensitivity to efficiency performance losses. In fact, such hybrids are readily implementable, given the high degree of electrical supply node commonality between the parent interface networks. The electric-water interfaces significantly benefit from this hybrid approach due to their large size and topological richness, while the electric-gas interfaces are too sparse to produce distinct topologies that benefit from topological retrofits. Hybrid topological effects are confirmed by comparing the normalized efficiency profiles of hybrid interfaces to those of the parent interfaces under hurricane and random disruptions. 
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N o t C o p y e d i t e d Algorithm 1 Generation of Interface Networks
Require: V P , V u {V P : set of transmission substations; V u : set of water or gas utility demand nodes (UDN)} Require: dist(s i , d j ) {Euclidean distance between substation s i ∈ V P and UDN d j ∈ V u } Require: T k (s i ) {The topological criterion to select transmission substations s i ∈ V P used for the k th interface connection} Require: N max {Maximum number of utility demand nodes connected to each substation s i } Require: ρ {Number of supply nodes s i linked to each demand node d j } 1: V Iu ← ∅ {Set of electrical substation nodes s i connected to UDNs} 2: E u ← ∅ {Set of edges connecting substations and UDNs} 3: k ← 1 {Counter variable} 4: repeat 5: 
OptimalSub ← ∅ {Substation maximizing T (s i ) (see Table 2 )} 8:
for all s i ∈ V P do E u ← e {Store assigned edge in edge set E u }
17:
V Iu ← OptimalSub {Store assigned substation in V Iu }
18:
end for 19: until (k == ρ) {Iterate until all UDNs have ρ connections to substations} 20: return [Return interface network
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N o t C o p y e d i t e d
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